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Campaign Design for
Winning the War . . .
and the Peace
PIERRE LESSARD

I

t had started so well. The most battle-worthy, best-trained, best-equipped,
and best-led army in the world had made a stunning advance in enemy
country. It had defeated the enemy army and captured its national capital. By
all rules of classical warfare, this should have been the end of it. But the enemy continued to resist. Soon, scattered elements were hitting back hard and
the long lines of communication were threatened. Hostile neighboring countries began to see the opportunities. . . .
The echoes of Napoleon’s campaign of 1812 in Russia still resonate
today: they are at the core of our understanding of war, and the relationship
between policy, strategy, and operational art.1 Statesmen and generals have
sought to explain this relationship ever since Socrates urged one of his students to go learn the art of war from a famous visiting general, only to hear
him report, upon his return, that he had learned “tactics and nothing else.”2
Recent history has merely reminded us of the paradox of the campaign of
1812 in Russia. Indeed, the numerous critiques, opinions, and analyses of the
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq center around one critical question, best
posed by Frederick Kagan: “Why has the United States been so successful in
recent wars and encountered so much difficulty in securing its political aims
after the shooting stopped?”3 The answer, for some, is political,4 while others
believe it lies with the US “method of warfare,”5 or with “a persistent bifurcation in American strategic thinking.”6
Yet US and NATO military doctrine are crystal clear that “wars are
successful only when political goals are achieved and these goals endure.”7 If
doctrine is sound at this level, the problem, if any, then surely lies elsewhere
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and suspicion must fall on the ways in which the ends are met. Is there a fault
line between strategy and operational art, and, if so, is it made worse by inadequate campaign design? The thesis of this article is that there is, and that the
current Western interpretation of campaign design must thus reunite with its
strategic roots of ends and means in its quest to seek ways of winning both the
war and the peace in the post-9/11 era.

The Current Interpretation of Campaign Design
The genesis and object of campaign design are intrinsically strategic. Indeed, campaign design seeks to devise ways in which strategic ends are
met through the employment of strategically generated means. It entails the
formulation of a commander’s vision and the application of the operational
art in the conduct of the campaign.8 To assist in what is essentially a creative
process aimed a solving complex military problems, commanders and campaign planners use a number of “elements”9 such as the center of gravity,
decisive points, lines of operation, etc. Unfortunately, these elements “hamstring planner’s and commander’s abilities to design and construct effective,
coherent campaigns for operations across the spectrum of conflict in today’s
security environment.”10
The first weakness of these elements is that they reinforce a pervasive
dichotomy between ends and ways. Indeed, while US joint doctrine states that
“campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives
must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture,”11 they are admonished two paragraphs later that “above all, the [operational] concept must
make it explicitly clear that the focus is on the destruction or neutralization of
the adversary’s [centers of gravity].”12 Since the latter are more often than not
defined at the operational level as the enemy’s armed forces (or a key element
thereof),13 the result is an undue focus on seeking battle rather than the attainment of policy itself. In Western civilization, this quest for battle is ingrained in
cultural tradition and values. It was codified in the writings of Clausewitz, who
declared that “destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of
war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal way to achieve our
object.”14 Such a view gave rise to the concept of the Battle of Annihilation
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(Vernichtungsschlacht). Here was an ideology, according to Simon Naveh,
that had an “addictive impact” on succeeding generations of military theorists
and practitioners who, unfortunately, lacked the cognitive tools to assess the
validity of Clausewitz’s work.15 In Antulio Echevarria’s analysis, the corollary
is the subsuming of a way of war into a way of battle, a practice shared by the
United States and its major allies.16 In contrast to this quest for battle stands a
competing viewpoint, expressed under Liddell-Hart’s pen as a pronouncement
that “battle is but one of the means to the end of strategy,”17 and exemplified in
history by several campaigns such as those of Belisarius, du Guesclin, Wallenstein, and Napoleon at Ulm.
These two competing views can generate cognitive dissonance in the
design of a strategy or campaign. In early 1942, for example, British and American strategists argued over whether it was best to immediately commence a
buildup for a direct attack of German forces over the English Channel, or to undertake a more indirect approach aimed at collapsing the Wehrmacht by strategic encirclement, from Norway through to the Mediterranean, capitalizing on
the expected uprising of conquered nations, and with a cross-channel assault
figuring only as a relatively minor “coup de grâce.”18 It is significant that, in the
end, neither view was fully implemented, revealing a truth about the nature of
strategy, to which we will return later.
The quest for battle is fed by the Western fixation on the center of
gravity. It is no exaggeration to say that this concept has spawned a cult-like
following, as evidenced by the massive literature devoted to it, some of it
reading more like the exegesis of holy Clausewitzian scripture.19 The volume
of discussion generated by this concept attests, in fact, to its somewhat nebulous nature. The validity, in today’s operating environment, of a concept
whose premise is that “sufficient connectivity exists among the various parts
of the enemy to form an overarching system (or structure) that acts with a certain unity”20 is also in question. In campaign design, however, the danger is
when the importance of the center of gravity is elevated above that of strategic objectives, to the point that it acts as a pole of attraction for many other elements of campaign design.
Decisive points are one such element, first postulated by Jomini, who
envisioned them as points “capable of exercising a marked influence either
upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.”21 Contemporary
usage offers campaign planners ample room to characterize a decisive point,
ranging from a geographic location to an event, a system, a function, or a condition. US doctrine emphasizes the advantage it confers over the enemy generally,22 instead of accomplishing effects useful to the attainment of strategic
objectives. Such a separation from strategy is even more pronounced in NATO
and Canadian doctrine, both of which specifically define it as a point from
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which a center of gravity can be threatened.23 Other elements of campaign design, such as the sequencing and arrangement of operations, simultaneity and
depth, and so forth, are also conceived only in terms of destroying the center of
gravity. The real danger, however, comes when the concept of “lines of operation” is introduced. Again, this is a Jominian term, whose original meaning
only intended the roads that “the army would follow to reach one of these
decisive points.”24 US doctrine today defines them as lines “which connect a
series of decisive points,”25 retaining a geographic slant (“directional lines
linking geographic decisive points”26) not found in NATO doctrine, which is
more conceptual and which, interestingly, envisions them as a form of “critical path.”27 In practice, they appear to have recently adopted a functional, or
capability-based character. General Tommy Franks’ lines of operation for the
2002 US intervention in Iraq, for instance, included operational fires, maneuver, and unconventional warfare.28 In both doctrine and in practice, however,
lines of operation lead to the center of gravity or “the defeat of an adversary
force,”29 rather than the achievement of strategic objectives.
The current interpretation of campaign design is, therefore, largely
based on a juxtaposition of land-centric Clausewitzian and Jominian concepts.
While useful individually, these have inherent conceptual and interpretive
weaknesses that can be compounded when employed in concert. Essentially,
their main flaw is that beyond the enemy center of gravity, one is left in a void,
hoping that things will turn out all right or, in the rather more elegant words of
Allied Joint Publication 3, that “the necessary leverage should exist to prevent
the enemy from resuming hostilities.”30 A better way must be found, but for
that, we must first consider the strategic ends.

The Ends
Strategy, declared Liddell-Hart, consists of “the art of distributing
military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”31 To understand these ends, we
must begin with the highest policy goal of any nation, which is security. In
World War II, for example, “The ultimate purpose of the (Western Allies) was
to remove a potential menace to themselves, and thus ensure their own security.”32 But what is security? At its core, according to Barry Buzan et al., “security is about survival,”33 giving the term “vital interest” its literal sense. The
conditions for survival usually revolve around the absence of threat and the
sustainment of life. Security is often accompanied by policy goals based on
national interests such as the increase of influence, wealth, and power. Altruism, the promotion of certain values, even proselytism, are other goals that
may influence a state’s policy. The desired end result is a new order, one that
satisfies the notion that “the object in war is to attain a better peace.”34 Of all
these broad goals, however, and notwithstanding differing interpretations of
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the aims of non-state actors,35 only narrowly defined national security can
justify the expense of a nation’s blood and treasure. Indeed, in the words of
Field-Marshal Douglas Haig, who was not shy about accepting casualties,
“Few of us believe that the democratization of Germany is worth the loss of a
single Englishman.”36
Policy goals, however, usually fall within the category of the “broad
generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation, and good will—unimpeachable
as ideals but of little use in determining the specific objectives we are likely to
pursue.”37 As William Flavin contends, “Military forces will rarely receive political objectives that contain the clarity they desire.”38 As a result, we must
now enter the province of military strategy, and the formulation of military
strategic objectives and end-states. Objectives may be defined as “the clearly
defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation
should be directed.”39 At the strategic level, US doctrine distinguishes between
“military strategic objectives”40 and “theater strategic objectives.”41 Sometimes, certain national or policy objectives will be of a clear military nature,
without being labeled as such. For instance, Canada’s “National Objectives” in
support of the US-led campaign in Afghanistan in November 2001 did not discern between political and military objectives.42 There may be wisdom in this,
since it affords both flexibility and unity of purpose.
The broader issue, though, is the relationship between strategic objectives and policy goals. There are two dimensions to this relationship: a sequential one and a hierarchical one. The first is closely tied to the definition of
war itself. According to Echevarria, “Failure to see the purpose for which a
war is fought as part of war itself, amounts to treating battle as an end rather
than means.”43 More to the point, as Flavin observed: “Conflict termination
and resolution are not the same thing. Conflict resolution is a long process. It
is primarily a civil problem that may require military support. Through advantageous conflict termination, however, the military can set the conditions
for successful conflict resolution.”44 Since the desired new order should tend
toward a steady state balance and, hence, conflict resolution rather than mere
conflict termination, the achievement of military strategic objectives is therefore likely to be sequential.
The second, hierarchical, dimension is driven by a quest for clarity.
Indeed, starting in the late 1980s, and in the wake of the 1984 “PowellWeinberger Doctrine” which called for “clearly defined political and military
objectives,”45 the end-state emerged as a new concept for helping envision the
aim. Defined as “the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the
commander’s objectives,”46 the end-state can be interpreted in three different
ways, according to the meaning attached to the word “condition.”47 Unfortunately, the end-state is a concept that implies that, once reached, the job is fin40
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“Is there a fault line between strategy and
operational art, and, if so, is it made worse
by inadequate campaign design?”

ished. In fact, the set of conditions achieved may well require long-term
military commitments or operations to sustain it, or else simply act as the starting point for follow-on operations, underscoring again the need for successive
sets of military objectives or conditions.
To the end-state, we have added operational, or campaign, objectives and end-states.48 Some regional Combatant Commanders have even introduced “campaign imperatives” to assist in orienting their campaign. Such
a proliferation of objectives and end-states exists to satisfy the military quest
for clarity, but is invariably problematic. Indeed, while clarity might be
achievable in conventional, decisive combat operations, it often remains elusive or ambiguous in peace-support or counterinsurgency operations. The
very terms can also be difficult. The traditional understanding of objectives
as a geographic or physical element, for instance, tends to skew their significance at the operational level. More important, all this pseudo clarity means
that operational commanders may be lulled into a false sense of certainty and
a belief that strategic ends, once received, are set in stone. To the contrary, the
changing nature of strategy may soon invalidate all such clarity.
Strategy is always dynamic, and nowhere more so than within that
tenuous, high-strung link between policy and military strategy. Translating
policy into strategy is arduous and takes time. In World War II after Pearl Harbor, for example, the United States had already deployed some 132,000 troops
to the Pacific Theater before some semblance of a coherent coalition strategy
could be formulated during the Arcadia conference of 22 December 1941 to 14
January 1942. In addition to the meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt,
this conference alone required some 12 meetings at the Chief of Staff level and
ten more at the lead planner level. Even then, the priority of theaters was a decision that had to be deferred.49 More recently, General Franks provides us with
evidence that well-advanced operational planning can still have unclear strategic objectives, which must therefore be stated as assumptions.50
Strategy formulation is also intellectually perplexing, as attested by
Eisenhower’s wartime admission that “the struggle to secure the adoption by
all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me
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down.”51 One of these difficulties is how purely political reasons can drive
strategy itself, as opposed to merely stipulating the higher purpose. To continue the World War II example, US strategic planners were opposed to a
landing in North Africa in 1942, but Roosevelt “considered it very important
to morale, to give [the United States] a feeling that they are at war, to give the
Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active
fighting across the Atlantic.”52 Military officers could be tempted to see such
political influences as something sinister, but in fact they merely reflect the
nature of politics. Roosevelt was simply the best judge of how to maintain the
public support necessary to the prosecution of a cataclysmic war like World
War II.53 In this case, it meant forsaking possibly sounder shorter-term strategy for longer-term prospects of victory.
Personality also will make the formulation of policy difficult. In World
War II, for example, an exasperated British Chief of the Imperial General Staff
confided, “Politicians . . . confuse issues, affect decisions, and convert simple
problems and plans into confused tangles and hopeless muddles. . . . It is all desperately depressing.”54
Furthermore, military strategy changes over time. Evolving policy
is one reason.55 For instance, Liddell-Hart distinguished between “permanent
policy,” which provides the national policy goal, and “policy in execution,”56
which we would now call national or coalition political objectives.57 The latter are also likely to be iterative in nature. According to Bob Woodward, for
instance, in the run-up to the 2002 US intervention in Iraq, policy was formulated or refined on at least three different occasions.58 But even steady policy
is no guarantee of a correspondingly unalterable military strategy. For example, in the 1999 Kosovo campaign, despite five clear and enduring policy
goals,59 military strategy changed at least three times.60 Such fluctuations are
by no means confined to modern warfare. Indeed, in World War II, Allied military strategy experienced no less than eight major decisions involving significant repercussions for theater- or operational-level commanders between
1942 and 1945, or about once every five months.61 Thus, military strategic objectives are rarely enduring, and campaign design must be sufficiently agile
to adjust to their fluctuations.
Compounding this difficulty are the different interests and objectives
of coalition powers. For example, in World War I, France’s war aims went beyond Britain’s goal of destroying Prussian militarism and reestablishing an independent Belgium. It included the restitution of the lost provinces of Alsace
and Lorraine, as well as the territory lost in the early stages of the war,62 and explains in no small measure why France accepted the highest number of casualties per capita of all the World War I participants.63 These different objectives,
and the degree to which a country fears for its survival, therefore create funda42

Parameters

mental differences in the options open to its statesmen, and will determine the
nature of that country’s commitment in terms of blood and treasure, with a corresponding impact on the formulation of coalition strategy.
We must also understand the nature and effect of military objectives
and end-states, which are not really ends as such, but rather interpretations of
the ends. The more objectives and end-states are allowed to proliferate, the
more they add filters, distance, and possibly obfuscation between operations
and policy. Yet military systems are not closed systems. They are open, complex systems, firmly integrated within broader societal, political, cultural,
and economic systems. Boxing campaign design in a construct using hermetic definitions of military objectives and end-states may have value, but
we must be aware of the dangers of losing sight of the aim. The logical, linear
derivation of strategy from policy is thus affected by intrinsic fluctuations,
making it somewhat of an iterative, parallel process. Acknowledging the inherent difficulties—and even incoherence—of strategy leads us to a new
campaign design model, one in which the fluctuating conditions of the desired new order become a constantly reappraised focal point.

The Means
The military strategic level is the first to make an estimate of the military means required, an essential condition to gaining political approval for a
strategic course of action. Since detailed operational-level planning has not
yet begun, only a general idea of the force required can result from this process or, in the words of Maurice Matloff, one of the official historians of the
US Army in World War II, “a ‘guess’ of what the task force commander might
consider necessary.”64 Even then, differing assumptions and potential concepts mean that these estimates can vary greatly.65 A further complication is
the fluctuating nature of the military forces required. Post-conflict operations
may, for instance, involve more troops than decisive combat operations.66 Beyond the requirement for the establishment of security and all the other responsibilities of an occupying power,67 such a force is also instrumental in
providing the strategic leverage alluded to before. For example, as late as
20 May 1919, some seven months after the armistice that terminated World
War I, the Allies directed the deployment of a force of 42 divisions, including
200,000 American troops, and moved toward renewing the blockade of Germany, “preparing for the possibility that the Germans would not sign the
peace treaty.”68 Elsewhere, the powers controlling the long Versailles treaty
negotiations quickly saw their leverage decrease commensurately with the
demobilization of their armed forces.69 Evolving strategic conditions therefore imply evolving operational-level means, a fact that greatly restrains
campaign design.
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“The quest for battle is fed by the Western
fixation on the center of gravity.”

Once a strategic course of action has some level of political agreement, there occurs, especially in a coalition environment, a complex set of negotiations involving “statements of requirements” by operational-level commanders, troop-contributing conferences, and so forth. Such a dynamic is a
facet of the inseparable relationship between the operational and strategic levels. The most likely outcome of the force-generation process is a multinational
force of very different capabilities and, even more important, differing mandates and political limitations. This may cause dismay in certain officers who
forget William Slim’s adage, “There’s only one thing worse than having allies—that’s not having any.”70
National limitations to military missions and tasks are particularly
misunderstood by senior coalition officers, as they appear to run against the
military ethos of teamwork and sharing of risk. In fact, they merely reflect
each nation’s appreciation of the threat to its own national security. Indeed,
unless national survival or security is directly threatened, most democracies
will, sensibly, assign mandates and rules of engagement that will restrict the
employment of their contingent within a coalition. Yet nowhere in doctrine do
we find mention of this. Presumably, then, forces are assumed to be available,
trained, able, and without limitations. In limited war, this is an assumption that
can lead to cognitive dissonance in the campaign design, as exemplified by
NATO’s 1999 campaign in Kosovo. As a humanitarian intervention, the character of this campaign was essentially altruistic. Certainly, none of the NATO
countries’ survival was threatened, which contributed to “significant disagreement . . . inside both the US and NATO militaries with regard to strategy and
priorities”71 and corresponding limitations on the mandates of individual national contingents. In extreme cases, such as Afghanistan, the means can be so
lacking that only a precarious end-state or a state of uneasy culmination can be
envisaged in the near and mid terms. Campaign design must thus offer methods
of quantifying shortfalls of means in terms of their impact on the formulation of
strategic objectives.
The greatest difficulty in evaluating the means of a campaign lies,
though, in another dimension. Since military systems are not closed systems,
they must interact with all instruments of national or coalition power in the
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achievement of the aim. Canada’s current operation in Afghanistan, for example, has embraced this concept as the “3D Approach” of defence, diplomacy, and development, “involving unprecedented levels of coordination
among government departments and agencies.”72 While the idea of this kind
of integration is not a new concept, recent operations and emerging doctrine
have highlighted its critical importance.73 But the short length of today’s campaigns means that planners no longer have the leisure to prepare for conflict
resolution activities as they had in past wars lasting years.74 Indeed, in World
War II, “formal doctrine for military government [and] a School of Military
Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began there about postwar reconstruction” as early as the spring of 1942.75 In today’s environment, an ad hoc approach to operational-level campaign design
involving all instruments of national power is insufficient. And although the
requirement for a tight supporting and supported relationship between agencies is acknowledged in US doctrine,76 it is not translated into an integrated set
of campaign design elements. We should now examine the ways of doing so.

The Ways
A number of new approaches to campaign design have been proposed to solve some of the challenges posed by the contemporary operating
environment.77 They range from a refinement of the currently used elements
to broad theories that have not yet yielded practical and integrated aids to
campaign planners and whose linkages to the higher purpose of war are not
apparent. The paragraphs that follow therefore propose a comprehensive approach, using redefined or new elements, and whose novelty resides chiefly
in the full integration of campaign design with policy and strategy.
If we accept that there is a single interagency campaign, then military operations must be sequenced across the campaign’s entire breadth and
depth to support the attainment of policy in full. That desired “resultant order” should be described as specifically as possible.78 For this, the focus must
be on the conditions, which will be termed here “Campaign Termination Conditions.” These must be the object of improved, dynamic, and systemic reassessment. The weakness of the daily “campaign assessment” now being
proposed under the aegis of emerging effects-based operations doctrine79 is
that, apparently, it measures effects achieved as part of a campaign against the
set of conditions initially envisioned as defining the strategic end-state, as opposed to an evolving or subsequent set of conditions. The latter may well call
for a validation, from first principles, of the entire campaign design. Only after these conditions are visualized is it appropriate to start thinking in terms of
method. From the Campaign Termination Conditions we derive “Campaign
Objectives,” which serve to focus effort, facilitate the communication of the
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commander’s intent, and establish a link to instruments of national and coalition power. The introduction of a single set of evolving Campaign Termination Conditions linking Campaign Objectives directly to policy goals is the
key advantage here, one that ensures a truly integrated approach.
There also can be no question of “end-states” at artificial junctures
in a campaign. Yet, it would be impractical for military planners to attempt
the production of a single major operation covering such a vast endeavor in its
entirety. A succession of major operations should therefore remain as critical
segments of a campaign. The transition between each of these operations
should also be defined by a set of forward-looking and evolving conditions
whose purpose is to enable the sequel operation. These can be termed “Sequel
Conditions,” eliminating the use of “end-states.” The final such set of conditions would coincide with Campaign Termination Conditions.
To illustrate, using the case of the recent US intervention in Iraq, the
primary US or coalition policy goals could have been, simply, national security and regional stability. The Campaign Termination Conditions satisfying
these goals have been expressed thus:
We would like Iraq to become a stable, united, and law-abiding state, within its
present borders, cooperating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbors or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective and representative government for
its own people.80

The Campaign Objectives here could have been “Replacement of the
Baath regime with a law-abiding democratic government,” “Elimination of the
Iraqi military threat to the region,” and so on. If predominantly military means
are chosen to achieve these objectives, it is possible to envision a sequence of at
least two major operations hinging on the elimination of the old order and the
emplacement of the new order. The Sequel Conditions defining this junction
would therefore contain elements of both elimination and creation. Thus, a classical condition such as “Iraqi military forces defeated or capitulated” would coexist with one such as “A safe and secure environment established for civil
government in Iraq,” with all that entails in terms of civil and military efforts.
Within an operation, certain sets of effects, or conditions, will need
to be achieved before others or, put another way, arranged and sequenced. Decisive points remain useful here, although their focus should be on effects
rather than on our own actions or supporting operations. “Enabling Effects”
would be a more appropriate term, one that allows greater consideration of
second- and third-order effects, a key element when planning sequel operations. More important, Enabling Effects must be identified as being under a
civil or military lead.
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Lines of operation can now be determined to link civil and military
sets of effects and conditions. In theory, lines of operation should reflect the
logical sequence or critical path of Enabling Effects. In practice, it may be
more advantageous for them to reflect a theme, function, or sector of effects.
This offers potential for clarifying the respective roles of military and civil
agencies. The use of “Civil Lines of Operation” or “Military Lines of Operation” is also helpful terminology, as long as it is understood that they imply a
“supporting/supported” framework, and not a compartmentalized approach.
One of the finest examples of this kind of mutual support is found in the synergy achieved by the French in the war in Algeria, between some 400 civilmilitary development teams, local Algerian leadership, and French Army
forces.81 That this relationship was not without complications and stresses
remains, however, a constant of contemporary operations, as attested by the
challenge of developing and implementing the “multi-year road map”82 in
Bosnia. This document was, for all practical purposes, an operational-level
interagency campaign plan using several lines of operation corresponding
to different sectors of activity, such as the economy, good governance, rule
of law, general security, and entity armed forces reductions. Each of these
lines of operation had multiple, sequential sets of effects, or conditions, to
achieve. This example also illustrates that Civil Lines of Operation often aim
at long-term policy goals, extending therefore through “Military Sequel Conditions,” which tend to succeed each other at shorter intervals. A final, key
characteristic of lines of operation is that they should not be directed at a conceptual center of gravity but should rather aim at the achievement of Campaign Objectives.

Conclusion
Campaign design involves finding ways to achieve strategic ends
using strategically generated means. Its current interpretation has contributed to great military victories but has not guaranteed the achievement of policy. This is the product of a lingering belief in the quest for a battle of
annihilation, and an overreliance on ill-defined concepts such as the center of
gravity, which becomes a pole of attraction for all campaign design elements,
even at the expense of the achievement of the policy goals.
Attempts to find solutions to this situation begin with a thorough
analysis of the nature of the ends, allowing us to conclude that the new model
of campaign design must acknowledge the inherent incoherence and, especially, the dynamic nature of strategy. The corollary is that the ends of that
campaign, or Campaign Termination Conditions, must be understood to coincide with the end of the war and the beginning of the peace, incorporating the
full achievement of policy. Campaign Termination Conditions may then be
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arranged into Campaign Objectives aimed at focusing civil and military efforts. To that effect, military operations need to succeed each other in sequence, using a set of Sequel Conditions as transitions between them. Within
each operation, Enabling Effects will continue that thread, allowing the sequencing of desired effects and their incorporation into lines of operation, directed at the achievement of Campaign Objectives, rather than the destruction or neutralization of a center of gravity or enemy force, and integrating all
instruments of national or coalition power. This new model of campaign design acknowledges the wider purpose of major military operations, reunites
operational art with strategy, and harmonizes military operations with other
instruments of national power.
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